The Economist 封面文章精读 20190126 (1)
The Economist 封面文章精读 20190126 (2)
Trade is suffering as firms use up the inventories they had stocked in anticipation of higher tariffs. Expect more of this in 2019. But what really matters is firms’ long-term investment plans, as they begin to lower their exposure to countries and industries that carry high geopolitical risk or face unstable rules. There are now signs that an adjustment is beginning. Chinese investment into Europe and America fell by 73% in 2018. The global value of cross-border investment by multinational companies sank by about 20% in 2018.
The new world will work differently. Slowbalisation will lead to deeper links within regional blocs(n.[C usually sing.]集团,阵营). Supply chains in North America, Europe and Asia are sourcing(v[T]if goods are sourced from a particular place, they are obtained from that place) more from closer to home. In Asia and Europe most trade is already intra-regional, and the share has risen since 2011. Asian firms made more foreign sales within Asia than in America in 2017. As global rules decay, a fluid patchwork(n.[sing.]something that is made up of a lot of different things) of regional deals and spheres of influence(sb’s/sth’s sphere of influence: a person’s, country’s, organization’s etc sphere of influence is the area where they have power to change things) is asserting control over trade and investment. The European Union is stamping its authority on banking, tech and foreign investment(stamp sth on sth: to make sth have an important effect or influence on sth), for example. China hopes to agree on a regional trade deal this year, even as its tech firms expand across Asia. Companies have $30trn of cross-border investment in the ground, some of which may need to be shifted, sold or shut.
Fortunately, this need not be a disaster for living standards. Continental-sized markets are large enough to prosper. Some 1.2bn people have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, and there is no reason to think that the proportion of paupers(n.[C]穷人) will rise again. Western consumers will continue to reap large net benefits from trade. In some cases, deeper integration will take place at a regional level than could have happened at a global one.
Yet slowbalisation has two big disadvantages. First, it creates new difficulties. In 1990-2010 most emerging countries were able to close some of the gap with developed ones. Now more will struggle to trade their way to riches. And there is a tension between a more regional trading pattern and a global financial system in which Wall Street and the Federal Reserve set the pulse for markets everywhere. Most countries’ interest rates will still be affected by America’s even as their trade patterns become less linked to it, leading to financial turbulence. The Fed is less likely to rescue foreigners by acting as a global lender of last resort(最终贷款人), as it did a decade ago.
Second, slowbalisation will not fix the problems that globalisation created. Automation means there will be no renaissance of blue-collar jobs in the West. Firms will hire unskilled workers in the cheapest places in each region. Climate change, migration and tax-dodging will be even harder to solve without global co-operation. And far from moderating(v[T,I]to make something less extreme or violent, or to become less extreme or violent) and containing(v[T]to stop something from spreading or escaping) China, slowbalisation will help it secure regional hegemony yet faster.
Globalisation made the world a better place for almost everyone. But too little was done to mitigate its costs. The integrated world’s neglected problems have now grown in the eyes of the public to the point where the benefits of the global order are easily forgotten. Yet the solution on offer is not really a fix(n.[C]解决方法) at all. Slowbalisation will be meaner and less stable than its predecessor. In the end it will only feed(v[T] to increase the strength of an emotion, desire etc) the discontent.
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